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LEAST COST ELECTRICITY FOR TEXAS
by
Karl R. Rabago
I. Global Climatic Change
The effects of consuming fossil fuels have disproportionately elevated human impor-
tance by the collective impact made on the world environment. Even the most buoyant
optimist can be depressed by adding the global climactic changes of the greenhouse effect
to a list that already includes air pollution, water pollution, soil contamination, health effects,
balance of trade deficits, declining technological competitiveness, and vanishing natural
resources. In Texas the primary source of electricity, and a major source of environmental
problems, is the combustion of fossil fuels. This article introduces the reader to some of the
environmental, economic, and regulatory challenges involved in responding to the green-
house effect through regulation of electric utilities.
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II. The Greenhouse Facts
Human activity is putting more greenhouse gases
-- carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH4), chlorinated
fluorocarbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxides (NOx), -- into
the atmosphere than at any time in our history.
1
Carbon dioxide emissions make up about 50% of the
total greenhouse emissions, with the electric power
industry and the use of motorvehicles each accounting
for about a third of carbon dioxide emissions. The
ambient level of carbon dioxide has grown substan-
tially in the last few decades.2 For 160,000 years
before the Industrial Revolution, the amount of CO2 in
the atmosphere was between 190 and 290 parts per
million (ppm). By 1959, the level reached 316 ppm. In
1988, the concentration was recorded at 350 ppm. And
the level is still rising. In all, the level of carbon dioxide
has risen about 25% over the last 100 years, and at the
same time, an average temperature increase of 10 F.3
Current opinion is divided over the relationship be-
tween these two phenomenon.4
Texas combustion of fossil fuels resulted in total
CO 2 emissions in 1988 of about 575 million tons. If
Texas were a nation, it would be the seventh largest
CO 2 emitter in the world. Based on CO2 output in 1988,
Texas ranks twelfth per capita, seventh per dollar of
industrial output, and first in total emissions in the
nation. From Texas' electric utilities, carbon dioxide
emissions rose by 11.3% between 1983 and 1988 to
167 million tons and are still rising.5
Ill. Other Fossil Fuel Problems
Carbon dioxide is not the only problem associated
with the unabated consumption of fossil fuels. Sulphur
dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide compounds (NO)) aid
in the formation of acid rain, which in turn contributes
to the formation of ground level ozone, the "bad" ozone
smog. Additionally, coal burning emits particulate
matter into the atmosphere. Fossil fuel consumption
causes adverse land and water effects, and the explo-
ration and production of coal, oil, and gas disturbs
landscapes and ecosystems. Coal-pile rainwater run-
off, gas leaks, and petroleum spills are continuing
problems despite all efforts. Ash disposal and mine
reclamation related to coal and lignite consumption
produce ground water contamination and other effects
that may last for decades.
IV. Inefficiencies and Ecology
The problems caused by greenhouse gases and
fossil fuel consumption are evidence of inefficiencies in
our society. Garrett Hardin's famous essay The Trag-
edy of the Commons, introduced the problem many
years ago.6 Drive a car that gets 10 mpg instead of one
that gets 20 mpg, and your inefficiency burdens you, in
the form of higher gas expenses, and also society at
large, by producing more pollution. Lowerthethermo-
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stat from 750 to 650 in the summer, and you pay the
powercompany more. You also dump more pollutants
into the atmosphere. Light your living room or office
with a 75-watt incandescent bulb instead of a 18-watt
high efficiency fluorescent, and the charges on your
electric bill, and to the atmosphere, are higher than
they need to be. Virtually everyone contributes to
,global climactic change, and to environmental prob-
lems in general, through the consumption of electricity.
The question, then, is how to create the electricity we
need to run everything from air conditionersto industry
while minimizing adverse environmental consequences.
In simplifying the rules of ecology, Barry Com-
moner explained that everything has to go somewhere
and that there is no such thing as a free lunch.7
Applying these principle to electric service, we can
derive some axioms: If we had to pay what energy
inefficiencies really cost, it would be much more expen-
sive. If energy efficiency is desirable, we must be
prepared to pay for it. To make intelligent decisions
about our choices, we need to compare things on a
level playing field.
V. The Texas Regulatory Framework
Investor-owned electric utility companies are basi-
cally monopolies. With the exception of a few large
industrial customers who can affordto supplytheirown
power, electric companies are the exclusive providers
of electricity to customers in their designated service
territories. The State allows this monopoly situation
because the alternative would be chaos.8 The State
requires a utility to provide reliable electric service for
the right to exist as a monopoly, and, in return, allows
the electric company to earn a reasonable rate of return
on their investments in plants, transmission lines, and
other facilities. This arrangement is termed the "regu-
latory compact." In Texas, the compact is supervised
by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT)
underthe Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) 9
and the substantive administrative rules10 that the
PUCT has adopted. From this arrangement, two main
problems begin to surface.
The first problem is that the PUCT has not aggres-
sively used the legal tools at its disposal. Generally,
the PU RA provides the tool that the PUCT could use to
perform "Least-Cost Planning." Least-Cost Planning
attempts to provide the least expensive yet most
environmentally sound electricity possible without com-
promising eitherthe utility companies' requirementsfor
revenue or the public's need for reliable electricity.
Most significantly, Least-Cost Planning shifts the tradi-
tional emphasis from supply-side management as a
way to provide electric service to management of the
demand-side as well. In essence, Least-Cost Planning
is pro-active rather than reactive. In some states, this
planning has led to the institution of bidding schemes
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in which utilities solicit both supply and demand sources
forthe least-cost source way to meet electric demand.
When the current version of the PURA was adopted in
1983, Texas emerged as a leader in adopting a statu-
tory Least-Cost Planning program. Today, however,
the PUCT practice is "least-cost" in name alone.11
The second problem with Texas' regulatory scheme
is the rate making formula and the way it works.12
Electric rates are the product of dividing the utility's
revenue requirements by forecasted electricity sales.
Revenue requirements are defined as invested capital
times a rate of return (a percentage intended to repre-
sent the utility's cost of capital including reasonable
profit), plus approved expenses incurred in providing
electric service. These definitions are critical in electric
rate cases heard and decided at the PUCT. These
costly, protracted proceedings attempt to determine
the accuracy of the utility's forecasts of sales, the
legitimacy of its expenses, and the prudence of its
investments.
Inthe end,the utility is awarded an appropriate rate
of return (to enable the company to compete for
financing) and the rates (a price per kilowatt hour of
electricity) are set. Utilities then rush to sell more
electricity to customers than forecasted because every
kilowatt hour sold over the forecasted amount gener-
ates virtually pure profit as it is not needed to satisfy
revenue requirements. Utilities also try to build electric
generating plants because investments in power plants
are the kind of capital investments that earn the utility
a rate of return. Of course, plant investments are
justified by the increasing electricity sales. Addition-
ally, tax incentives and allowances make fossil fuel
artificially cheaper than clean technologies. Thus,
Texas' regulatory framework encourages global warm-
ing, environmental degradation, and unwarranted in-
creased consumption of energy.
VI. The Supply Side: Choosing Environmentally
Sound Generation
The solutions to society's fossil fuel addiction lie in
clean, renewable energy sources and aggressive pur-
suit of conservation and efficiency. Despite a huge
potential for each, Texas is the biggest energy hog in
the nation.13 Although the utility companies should do
more, and the PUCT should require more, the lack of
effort in Texas is defined by economic realities.
Environmentally sound renewables (wind, passive
solar, photovoltaic, biomass) appear at first to be more
expensive than many fossil technologies. As a result,
electric rates appear lower with a regulatory prefer-
ence for less expensive fossil fuel. But consumers
directly pay only for extraction, delivery, disposal, and
regulatory compliance. The cash price and utility
decisions do not, in Texas, reflect the real costs in
terms of environmental, social and health costs. Sev-
eral studies have quantified externality costs,'4 and
several states mandate consideration of these costs in
utility planning.'5 Whenthese costs arefactored, clean
technologies become competitive with fossil fuels and
may even change fuel choices.'6
Even a rough estimation of externality costs and
benefits can be encouraging. Natural gas is a more
efficient fuel than coal and, therefore, more environ-
mentally friendly. In addition, production of Texas' own
natural gas creates benefits in terms of severance
taxes and jobs that make it the fuel of choice for
electricity generation in our state. Conservation and
efficiency-doing the same work with less electricity-
are virtually free of externality costs and have real
costs that make them competitive with supply-side
options. These conclusions have been corroborated in
a ground-breaking study conducted by the Pace Uni-
versity Center for Environmental Studies.' 7 Aggres-
sive pursuit of alternative energy sources, including
conservation and efficiency improvements, will create
a demand for cost and technological improvement that
could help the United States regain its leadership
posture in the world and create new jobs in Texas-all
externality benefits.
To build a new power plant, a utility in Texas must
first obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
("CCN") from the PUCT. 18 To apply for a CCN, the
utility must first file a notice of intent to file an applica-
tion for certification.' 9 The PUCT's new Notice of
Intent Rule ("NOI Rule") requires consideration of
extemalities when a utility proposes to build generating
plants.20 In the first major case underthe NOI Rule, a
Texas utility has argued that compliance with the Rule
is impossible.21 The PUCTs ultimate decision will test
the validity of this argument and, more importantly,
whether the Commission will act "to protect the public
interest inherent in the rates and services of public
utilities, '22 as required by PURA.
Utility representatives often argue thatthe environ-
mental costs of electricity are equal only to the cost of
complying with laws and regulation. But, the cost of
legal compliance does not include externalities. Basi-
cally, the utilities argue that if a ton of SO 2 has a permit
attached to it (making it a residual emission), then that
S0 2 cannot hurt anyone. Since CO 2 is not yet regu-
lated by the federal or Texas governments, the argu-
ment continues that CO 2 emissions do not have any
environmental cost at all. Even if carbon taxes are
adopted to encourage reductions in CO2 emissions,
compliance costs are still only the cost to comply with
extant law, and may not reflect damage costs. What
planners and regulators must also consider are the
damage costs associated with residual emissions.
When damage costs are unavailable, carefully deter-
mined control costs may serve as a reasonable proxy.23
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VII. The Demand Side: Choosing Conservation
and Efficiency
Conservation is economically disfavored under
the current Texas regulatory scheme and the tradi-
tional rate making formula. Monies spent on conserva-
tion programs are, at best, merely operating expenses
and never get multiplied by the rate of return percent-
age. Even when costs are passed to electric custom-
ers as expenses, the utilities realize that generating
plants earn more revenue than conservation and effi-
ciency programs. This relationship is also the reason
many so-called "efficiency" programs run by Texas
utilities do nothing more than sell electricity. Incentives
to replace efficient gas heaters with electric heat
pumps are a classic example. "Mr. Redi-Kilowatt" now
lives in the "Good Cents Home."
Conservation reducesthe numberof kilowatt hours
a power company sells. This result of conservation
means that the utility has to obtain its revenue require-
ment from fewerkilowatt hours sold, and consequently,
rates could go up. Likewise, if conservation programs
are not made available to the broadest possible range
of participant customers or are poorly designed, they
may increase rates. Also, non-participant conserva-
tion to keep bills low in the face of rising rates creates
a free-rider effect for utilities that can jeopardize the
company's bottom line.24 To prevent these effects,
while justifying a lack of real conservation effort, some
Texas utilities pre-screen conservation programs un-
der a "no-losers" test. No matter how much partici-
pants in the conservation program save, if non-partici-
pant ratepayers realize rate increases, the test labels
non-participants as losers. If the program produces
any losers, it is not adopted. Erroneous assumptions
underlying this test are the reason some call it the
"hardly any winners" test. First, the whole "no losers"
idea assumes that everyone cares what they pay per
kilowatt hour for electricity, but what customers really
care about are bi//s-rates times usage. Even if rates
go up, bills can still shrink as long as usage is reduced.
Second, conservation does not produce losers-all
citizens benefit from the reduced pollution that comes
from reductions in electricity consumption. Last, utility
companies are able to give virtually every customer an
opportunity to participate in conservation programs.
(They prove their skill at reaching all consumers when
they try to sell more electricity.) Utilities must seek to
involve all customers in effective conservation pro-
grams and not waste resources on justifying a lack of
program effort.
Virtually all utility excuses for why conservation
and efficiency programs should not be adopted are
designed to obscure one basictruth-for utility compa-
nies, conservation does not pay. Therefore, regulatory
initiative to overcome economic biases and create
incentives for desirable utility behavior is crucial. The
PUCT must demonstrate a commitment to a cleaner
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environment, lowertotal cost for electric service, and a
desire to avoid costly investments in large generating
plants.
Again, current Texas law allows these results, but
the PUCT has demonstrated little leadership. Sub-
stantive rules allow incentive awards to utilities for
implementing conservation programs, 25 but utilities
cannot be certain as to when an award will be granted,
how much the award will be, or which specific pro-
grams will merit award. Economically rational incen-
tive programs, some designed by utilities themselves,
are in place in several states and are producing results.
In the Northeast, some utility companies are giving
high efficiency light bulbsto residential and commercial
customers. In California, one utility provides a $10
rebate for bulbs a customer buys.
High efficiency light bulbs are an example worth
examining in a little more detail because the benefits
associated with an efficient lighting program can be
dramatic. 26 If one 75-watt incandescent bulb is re-
placed with one 18-watt high efficiency compact fluo-
rescent, the savings in energy amount to 570 kilowatt
hours over the life of the bulb. The high efficiency bulb
costs about $15.00, compared to about $1.50 for the
incandescent, but lasts about 10 times as long. The
energy savings produce environmental savings. If the
electricity forthe old bulb would have come from a coal
plant, about a ton of CO2 and about 8 kilograms of S0 2
are avoided, as well as NOx, heavy metals, and other
pollutants. If the electricity would have come from a
nuclear plant, the high efficiency bulb saves about 1/2
curie of strontium-90 and cesium-137, both high level
radioactive wastes, and about 25 mg of plutonium.
That much plutonium is equivalent to almost a half ton
of TNT, and, if evenly distributed in human lungs,
equals about 2,000 cancer-causing doses. Additional
economic savings are available as well. The high
efficiency bulb avoids about $20.00 in replacement
bulb costs plus installation and labor for those bulbs,
about $20.00 in utility fuel, and some $200-300 in
deferred generating plant capacity required at the
utility company. In all, efficiency is not just good for the
environment, it makes sense for the economy, too.
VIII. The Sunset Opportunity
Fortunately for Texas, an opportunity will soon be
availableto addressthe legal and regulatory problems.
The PUCT is about to undergo its second Sunset
review, and the PURA is set to expire in September
1993.27 The necessary changes are relatively minor
and, more importantly, politically palatable. In the
consideration of proposals to build new generating
plants, the PUCT need only hold utilities to the plain
language of its current Notice of Intent Rule. To resolve
doubt, the Rule should be revised to clearly state that
a utility must quantify (i.e. monetize) the externality
costs and benefits of all supply-side and demand-side
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alternatives that can meet demand, including conser-
vation and efficiency programs. Optimally, the PUCT
would adopt a set of default externality values by rule,
but utilities should be free to proffer more accurate
quantifications. Then the PUCT could truly ensure the
least costly electric service possible.
The most important changes would have to be
made in the way utilities consider, and are rewarded
for, conservation. The PURA should be changed to
require a"total societal costs and benefits"test instead
of the "no-losers" test. This change would preclude
premature exclusion of conservation and efficiency
programs from utility consideration. In addition, and
most importantly, the PURA should mandate that "a
kilowatt hour saved is at least as profitable to the utility
as a kilowatt hour sold."28 Under such a regime, utilities
could put conservation in their rate base and earn a
return ontheirconservation investments. Detailscould
be worked out in substantive rules, but it is clear that
utilities will not pursue conservation until they see a
business advantage in doing so.29
IX. Conclusion
As with many environmental issues, those arising
from the production and consumption of electricity are
susceptible to a disabling polarity of interest. Wise,
economically informed law and regulation, however,
offers a true potential for 'Win-win" solutions. With
electricity conservation and efficiency, doing the right
thing can and should be made the most profitable
choice-profitable for ratepayers, for utilities, forTexas,
and for the environment. If the scientists are right
about global climatic change, and we must assume
that they are, the future of our planet lies in the balance.
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